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Introduction: better men 
Men made the Empire, according to countless stories consumed by 
late Victorian and Edwardian readers, and, according to other stories just 
as numerous, the Empire made men. The divergent emphases of these 
two propositions suggest a muddled reaction to the range of doubts that 
stories of men and Empire were called upon to relieve: could the strained 
and far-flung Empire, increasingly beset by powerful economic and 
military rivals, be preserved by Britain's stout, manly spirit? Or was it 
that the men of a degenerate metropole required a stiff dose of the frontier 
to scour off the accumulated weaknesses of an over-civilized life? The 
confusion of the causal priority of manliness and Empire , however, does 
not diminish the significance of a broader cultural conviction that the two 
were mutually constitutive , that they made and reaffirmed each other. 
This book examines a wide range of accounts of the exploits of British 
heroes across real and imagined frontiers, but it is ultimately concerned 
with a broader story of ideological change. Its real subject, in other words, 
is not men and Empire but the ideas of masculinity and imperialism, 
and the cultural synthesis they achieved between 1870 and 1914. The 
historical specificity of this frame is crucial, not only because the connec-
tions between masculinity and imperialism were more pronounced at 
this time than ever before, but also because new understandings of each 
of these ideologies were consolidated during the same period. By the 
late nineteenth century, the standard of manliness was carried by new 
champions; paragons of midcentury manliness, such as the entrepreneur , 
the missionary, and the affectionate family man, had been elbowed aside 
by the untamed frontiersman, the impetuous boy, and the unapologetic-
ally violent soldier. Imperialism, meanwhile, rose to the center of popular 
consciousness just as its political justifications were fundamentally trans-
formed . Emerging arguments about the meaning of manhood and 
the purpose of Empire turned to each other for cultural authority, and 
popular literature, which was undergoing changes of its own, mediated 
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the combination and disseminated to a wide and enthusiastic audience 
new fantasies of an imperialist masculinity. 
Reflecting ruefully on these cultural transformations, Charles Master-
man, Liberal journalist and soon to be MP for West Ham North, blamed 
the work of popular writers. These "Apostles of the New Imperialism" had 
successfully contrived a great betrayal of the literary mission: "Literature, 
after its long alliance with the party of reform, had deliberately deserted to 
the enemy."1 Midcentury literature, Masterman argues, had been cosmo-
politan, humanitarian, progressive - in a word, liberal. The new literature, 
by contrast, was above all imperialist, and imperialist in a "frankly Tory" 
way, one which "branded Liberalism as but a gigantic fraud by which the 
weak deluded the strong."2 Not long ago, sanguine liberals had imagined 
an end to war, a brotherhood of nations united by trade, and the radiation 
of the "sweet reasonableness of the English character" across the globe. 
Now, bloodthirsry reactionaries "clamoured for the ancient Barbarism; 
and delighted in war; and would spread English civilization, not by a 
diffusion of its ideas but by the destruction of its enemies."3 It was not 
even dear, Masterman goes on, that the values literature had come to 
embrace were English at all. If at some moments the New Imperialists 
crowed about English supremacy, at others they "neglected and despised 
the ancient pieties of an older England, the little isle set in its silver sea. 
Greatness became bigness; specific national feeling parochial."4 
Masterman writes with the hyperbole of a frustrated partisan, but 
there is considerable substance behind his generalization about literature's 
turn to the aggressive, illiberal politics of the New Imperialism. The 
popular genres examined in this book, including pirate stories, military 
adventures, mummy tales, and lost-world fiction, all captured the imagin-
ation of enormous readerships and asked them to identify with heroes 
transformed by encounters with a vast, exotic, and savage world. Civilized 
England, as many of their protagonists thought, seemed narrow and dull 
by comparison. And though the point is only hinted at in Masterman's 
critique, much of this literature was also explicitly and self-consciously 
masculine. Aimed at a readership of men and boys, these stories centered 
on interactions between male characters; women - especially British 
women - were driven to the narrative margins, leaving questions of 
masculine identity to be decided by relations between and within male 
groups rather than by reference to feminine virtues. The new conventions 
of popular literature, moreover, emerged in the context of the romance 
revival of the 1880s, itself a highly gendered rejection of what were thought 
to be enervating feminine themes of contemporary realism and its delicate, 
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over-refined studies of character. In place of these, masculine romance 
would offer imaginative and exhilarating yarns that would speak to what 
Andrew Lang called "the savage within us," and "the old barbarian under 
our clothes."5 Lang's claim that popular romances spoke to an abiding 
savagery in male nature corroborates Masterman's point that literature had 
abandoned progressive themes and "clamoured for the ancient Barbarism," 
but it also raises one of the most intriguing and overlooked dimensions 
of the New Imperialist masculinity: the extent to which it was articulated 
around images of foreign men - even non-white, uncivilized colonial 
subjects - as exemplars of proper manliness. 6 
Restlessly searching for aspirational models of better men, the New 
Imperialists often turned their eyes abroad, even to the enemies they 
confronted and the peoples they had conquered. If we are surprised by 
the diversity of places in which they claimed to discover such men, it may 
be because our expectations have been conditioned by the axioms of 
postcolonial cultural criticism. One of the most central of these, after 
all, has been the thesis that the Western imperial imagination is founded 
on the imperative to differentiate unconditionally between colonizers and 
their subjects, and thus to produce justificatory stereotypes about colon-
ized peoples - their violent barbarism, their irresponsible childishness, 
their superstitious ignorance - that emphasized their distance from the 
civilized nations who were thereby entitled to rule them. In light of this 
thesis, the many counterexamples examined in this book pose a fascinating 
conundrum: at the very moment of Britain's greatest colonial power, the 
zenith of its cultural arrogance and racial chauvinism, the Empire was 
bolstered by fantasies of a manhood that transcends the distinctions of 
border and breed. Why is it that relationships between men, even if only 
imaginary, could function as an exception to the imperial rule? Through 
an analysis of popular literature aimed at men and boys, I show that the 
same stereotypes that had been used to denigrate the colonial Other were 
adapted by late Victorian and Edwardian men to crystallize new masculine 
ideals and give form to emerging cultural desires that were unrepresentable 
in the images of manhood they inherited from their fathers. The exotic 
barbarian was held up to male audiences as a figure with whom they had 
much in common, and who might therefore hold the keys to both a 
reinvigorated individual life and an empire made fierce enough to with-
stand the pressures of late nineteenth-century geopolitics. 
The phrase "better men" reverberates through the wide range of popular 
texts considered in this book, appearing so frequently, I will suggest, 
because it promised an answer to urgent questions about the ideals of 
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masculinity and the global networks of power that shaped it. The note was 
struck most famously by Rudyard Kipling, Masterman's chief example of 
the literary "Apostles of the New Imperialism." Kipling's memorable line 
"You're a better man than I am, Gunga Din," provocatively recognizes 
superior masculine qualities in a foreigner who would once have been 
easily derided. The following chapters will explore many variations on this 
theme, beginning with an explication of "Gunga Din." I will argue that 
the force of Kipling's line for his contemporaries depends on a profound 
reorientation of the very notion of better manhood, one promoted by 
changing imperial politics: where early and mid-Victorian ideals of mascu-
linity emphasized narratives of personal development (I am a better man 
than I was), later imperialist stories stressed continual competition (I am a 
better man than he is). This agonistic model could imagine putatively savage 
peoples as important players in a perpetual masculine contest, and not only 
as the opponents of British men but also as their counterparts or guides. 
At the same time, the dream of unceasing competition between men could 
naturalize and support the increasingly aggressive values that characterized 
the politics of imperialism from the 1870s to the First World War. 
Asked to describe the Victorian ideal of manhood, most of us would 
probably conjure an image from the middle of the nineteenth century, 
say, 1860 or so: an earnest, mature, hard-working, morally upright pater-
familias, frock-coated and (in that decade) full-bearded. The prominence 
of this type represents the triumph of decades of ideological work through 
which middle-class values, drawing on liberal economics and evangelical 
seriousness, supplanted the older and increasingly disreputable image 
of gentry masculinity while appropriating and reworking some of its terms 
of approbation, such as gentlemanliness and chivalry.7 The middle-class 
hero of midcentury, unlike his gentry predecessor, could make a virtue of 
trade and commerce, and - especially after the exhortations of muscular 
Christianity 8 - join in the strenuous crusade of social transformation. But 
his chief struggle was moral and internal. As both Herbert Sussman and 
James Eli Adams have shown, the master value of midcentury manliness 
was self-discipline, the ability to resist temptation and channel the springs 
of male energy to laudable ends. This inward drama was popularly staged 
as a narrative of moral maturation (as in David Copperfield's eventual 
mastery of his "undisciplined hean") 9 whereby a liberal developmental 
ideal of self-culture steered the natural impulses of boyhood into a carefully 
regulated manliness. No other challenge a man faced mattered more 
than this primary struggle for moral self-discipline: "the highest virtue," 
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as Samuel Smiles advised, was "the victory over ourselves."1° Charles 
Kingsley's similar point suggests how the manliness of self-discipline could 
be used in an imperial context to differentiate English virtue from the 
behavior of unmanly savages: "To be bold against the enemy is common to 
the brutes; but the prerogative of a man is to be bold against himself. "11 
The same quality of self-discipline used by Malthus to distinguish civiliza-
tion from barbarity had become a means of defining manliness against 
the primal competitiveness of the savage. 
Self-mastery was the close corollary of another key masculine ideal, 
autonomy, which was itself an affirmation of liberal individualism over 
the old aristocracy's hierarchical network of obligations, patronage, and 
deference. Yet for all his isolating independence, the manly struggler 
against himself was at least allowed the support of his domestic circle. 
The importance of family relationships to masculine identity has long 
been obscured by the inertia behind the stereotype of separate spheres, 
the starkly gendered division between masculine public activity and 
the feminine sanctuary of the household. But as we have been reminded 
by such influential histories as Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall's 
Family Fortunes and John Tosh's A Man's Place, domestic life in its 
real and idealized forms was a central pillar of middle-class masculine 
identity. As Tosh puts it, "The Victorian ideal of domesticity was in all 
respects the creation of men as much as women. 'Woman's sphere' was a 
convenient shorthand, not a call to exclusivity."12 The comfortable 
household signified not only a man's success as a breadwinner, but also 
a haven in which his manly character could be bolstered by the moral 
influence of his wife or expressed through his divinely sanctioned author-
ity, as when he led the household in prayer. Domesticity thus offered 
men profound pleasures of its own: "only at home could a man be truly 
and authentically himself. While the workplace and the city crippled 
his moral sense and disturbed his human relationships, home gave play 
to feelings of nurture, love and companionship, as well as 'natural' forms 
of authority and deference; it nourished the whole man."' 3 The domestic 
ideal framed interpretations of the Empire as well, so that the civilizing 
mission was often represented as an effort to reproduce its gender 
norms overseas. Thus British outrage over the Sepoy "Mutiny" in 
1857 was fanned by accounts that emphasized its assault on domesticity. 
The Indian rebels who had violated British homes and murdered women 
and children were unmanly, but Henry Havelock, the great masculine 
hero of the Mutiny's suppression, was celebrated as a man of "warm 
domestic sympathies. "14 
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What became of our ideal man of 1860? Scholarly investigations 
of gender and sexuality during the later Victorian and Edwardian periods 
have been engrossed by rebellions against the norm: aesthetes and deca-
dents, sexual dissidents of all sorts, the New Woman and, more recently, 
her counterpart, the New Man. The powerful insights of this scholarship, 
however, have overshadowed another vital part of the story, which is 
that masculine norms were themselves in flux. Several independent lines 
of evidence point to an erosion of the midcentury ideal. David Newsome, 
for instance, notes the decline of the principle of moral maturity in the 
late nineteenth century: the sense that boys could hardly be hurried into 
adulthood quickly enough gave way to a version of manliness that hardly 
cared "to make boys into men at all."15 J. A. Mangan's work on the games 
ethic, meanwhile, shows that while athleticism rose rapidly to cultural 
prominence, it also departed from its earlier goals, enshrining a manliness 
that had less to do with moral character than aggressive competition. 16 
John Mackenzie charts the rise of new popular exemplars of masculinity 
during the same period; where Smiles had celebrated the engineer, entre-
preneur, and missionary, later generations were enthralled by the hunter 
and, especially from the 1870s on, by the imperial soldier.17 Tosh, mean-
while, argues that the 1870s were the beginning of an even more telling 
transformation, which he calls "the flight from domesticity": wearied of 
domestic pleasures and worried by emerging forms of women's authority, 
increasing numbers of men rejected or postponed marriage, finding their 
satisfactions instead within groups of male peers in homosocial institutions 
such as the club, the athletic organization, or the military. 18 All of these 
developments, along with others described later in this book, converge 
during the late nineteenth century in the consolidation of what we might 
call - with some caution - a new hegemonic masculinity. 
The analytic frame of hegemonic masculinity that informs this study 
derives from the work of the sociologist Raewyn Connell, who uses the 
term to distinguish a society's most authoritative construction of mascu-
linity from other subordinated or marginalized models with which it 
coexists: "At any given time," she argues, "one form of masculinity rather 
than others is culturally exalted."19 Connell's approach is not without its 
critics, who point out that to select one cluster of masculine values as 
hegemonic can oversimplify the diverse range of other contemporary ideals 
as well as the even more intricate interactions between possible gendei; 
configurations in the experience of individual lives. 20 Yet Connell' s frame-
work remains valuable at the level of cultural analysis because it challenges 
us to understand how some masculine models enjoy a privileged 
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relationship to institutional power, and thus exercise enormous influence 
over the lives of men and women whether they accept those models or not. 
At the same time, Connell's concept implies the fragility and contingency 
of a dominant model - any hegemonic masculinity stands uneasily at a 
moment between the configuration it has displaced and that which will 
displace it - and so spurs us toward a more historically nuanced analysis 
than, say, the uncomplicated alignment of masculine identities with social 
class. Connell's framework is helpful for the purposes of this book, more-
over, because it highlights the power of an idealized masculinity, even when 
the kinds of activity promoted by the ideal are unavailable to the men 
who consent to it. Before the First World War, only a fraction of Victorian 
and Edwardian men had any direct experience of military or colonial life, 
much less of the rowdy voyages of colonial adventure fiction, but popular 
audiences found the dream of imperial masculinity no less compelling. 
Outside the relatively few studies that have taken it as their particular 
focus, the conventional scholarly wisdom about imperial manliness has 
been content to point to a few of its most conspicuous traits - its 
militarism, its hostility to feminine influence, and its fascination with 
the powerful male body - and declare the period to be an age of 
"hypermasculinity." Yet that term misleadingly implies that the effect of 
the Empire was merely to intensify and exaggerate masculine values 
that already existed (or, more misleadingly still, that exist always and 
everywhere). In fact, just as the New Imperialism was not merely an 
escalation of earlier political commitments but a seismic revision of the 
Empire's purpose, so too was imperial masculinity marked by its readiness 
to reject earlier masculine values. The record of popular literature allows us 
to trace the displacement of these older forms and follow the ideological 
ramifications of imperialist masculinity to important new insights. It can 
show us, for instance, that fantasies of all-male communities subordinated 
not only the mid-Victorians' cherished domesticity, but also their belief 
that a man's most important struggle was against the standards of his own 
conscience. Judgments of the male group superseded the self-scrutiny of 
moral improvement, and shame surpassed guilt as the paramount mode of 
male anxiety. Discipline turned outward, too, from the internal struggle 
for self-mastery to a collective mode of discipline epitomized by the 
military, or to the individual resistance to external hardships prized by 
the growing emphasis on masculine endurance. At the same time, instinct 
and spontaneity could be valued over painstaking deliberation, and 
impulse and irrationality taken for passionate male authenticity . Tran-
scendent principles or universal laws came to be less appealing than 
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malleable rules that enabled ludic, amoral contests of cleverness and guile. 
Above--all, popular literature can show us that transvalued stereotypes of 
savagery became potent symbols of masculine possibilities, so that atavism 
could be imagined as a sign of strength rather than weakness, exoticism as 
one of virility rather than effeminacy, and the relapse into barbarism as an 
empowering fantasy rather than a paralyzing anxiety. "Hypermasculinity" 
scarcely does justice to these richly complicated and often contradictory 
aspects of manliness, nor does it help us to see how thoroughly consistent 
they were with the new demands of imperial politics. 
By the 1870s, England was already the center of a vast Empire, but in the four 
decades preceding the First World War it set its bounds wider still and wider. 
Among the many new protectorates, colonies, and annexations during this 
period we might list the Gold Coast (1874), Cyprus (1878), Egypt (1882), 
North Borneo (1882), Upper Burma (1888), British East Africa (1888), South-
ern Rhodesia (1889), Kuwait (1899), Sudan (1899), and the several colonies 
and conquered regions that were ultimately federated as South Africa in 1910. 
All told, the territory added to the Empire in these decades amounted to 
some forty times the area of today's United Kingdom. Even as the Empire 
expanded, however, it faced new challenges from other empires that were 
consolidating and widening their own spheres of economic, political, and 
military influence. The alarmingly swift defeat of the French in the 
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) marked not only the rise of a powerful 
German Empire but also the beginning of intense imperial rivalries, 
European contests for resources and prestige that were decided in distant 
terrains of Africa and the Pacific. The many little wars, diplomatic negoti-
ations, and innovations in legislation and colonial administration that 
refashioned the British Empire during this period cannot be adequately 
sketched in this book, which provides only enough background to allow 
readers to follow specific arguments as they relate to particular instances 
of colonial domination and imperial rivalry; readers who wish to learn 
more about the events discussed in this book- such as the Sepoy Rebellion, 
the Royal Titles Act, the occupation of Egypt and campaigns in the 
Sudan, or the Second Boer War - can, I hope, readily find overviews in 
widely available sources. In the following few pages, I want to emphasize 
a different kind of context, a background essential for the broader argu-
ments of this study, but one that is possibly less familiar and certainly less 
accessible than the lists of battles and bills. The context that requires 
elaboration is the momentous turn in British attitudes about the import 
and mission of the Empire. 
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The 1870s, pivotal years in the history of masculinity, also saw the birth of 
what would later be called the New Imperialism. Historians have disagreed 
about the precise definition of this term, its explanatory value, and even 
the boundaries of the period to which it should be applied, so it is necessary 
to clarify how the term will be used here.21 By the "New Imperialism" I mean 
the cultural conviction, rooted in political discourse but broadly diffused 
through the media of popular culture, that the Empire was the source and 
proofofBritain's glory. In a period ofintensifying rivalry with other emerging 
imperial powers, the Empire would be the bulwark of British prestige and 
global influence, so that close bonds with the colonies of white settlement 
required careful fostering, while control over non-white colonial dependen-
cies had to be jealously maintained. It is in relation to these core beliefs -
rather than to any coherent set of colonial policies or fits of territorial 
acquisition - that we can plausibly speak of the New Imperialism as the 
culturally ascendant ideology of empire from its emergence during the 
great political debates of the 1870s until its collapse on the battlefields of 
the First World War. To analyze its impact on Victorian and Edwardian 
popular culture, however, we must attend not only to the central convictions 
of the New Imperialism, but also to the nimbus of qualities and attitudes with 
which it became associated. These included, first of all, a frankly competitive 
spirit, demonstrated by an aggressive assertion of national prestige against 
threats from rivals and a militant readiness to defend or expand its influence 
(from the late 1870s, the more feverish demotic eruptions of this spirit would 
be called jingoism). Moreover, in its fixation on prestige, the New Imperialist 
ethos was attentive to appearances, attracted to the performative and even 
theatrical dimensions of power, enamored by spectacle, ceremonial pomp, 
and the bold symbolic stroke. Where the gesture failed, it was prepared to 
turn to naked force, and it intensely appreciated the military vinues. It was 
deeply concerned with honor, but less patient with the prohibitions of law, 
religion, and morality; to its proponents, this emphasis could be read as a 
pragmatic and realistic defense of British interests within the complex game 
of imperial powers, but to its enemies it seemed opportunistic, unprincipled, 
and Machiavellian. All these attitudes, as I shall argue over the course of 
this book, became attached in various degrees and combinations to popular 
representations of manhood. To clarify these broad strokes, we ought to begin 
with an individual man with whom all of these qualities were associated, 
Benjamin Disraeli, whose persona and policies were the chief inspiration 
for the New Imperialism, and who was enshrined in the years after his death 
as its symbolic champion. To appreciate the novelty of Disraeli's influence, 
however, we must take a step further back to his great rival, William 
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Gladstone, who became just as potent a symbol of liberal imperialism as 
Disraeli became of the ideology that eclipsed it. 
In the most important midcentury statement of his position on the 
Empire, "Our Colonies" (1855), Gladstone argues that the global extension 
of European power since the seventeenth century had been undertaken 
for all the wrong reasons. The colonization of the Americas, for example, 
had been driven by an irrational "love of gold" despite the claims of some 
colonists to have been motivated by the impulse to spread the word of God: 
''the history of the European civilisation in the West is a history of anything 
other than the propagation of the gospel."22 Other material justifications for 
colonization had been similarly misguided. Those who sought to enhance 
the revenue of their mother countries, especially by establishing exclusive 
trading relationships, were blind to the truth later revealed by liberal political 
economists that only free, open, and_ mutually beneficial trading partnerships 
could effectively create wealth. Those who wanted to seize new lands 
had yielded to an even more pernicious impulse, since the "lust and love 
of territory have been among the greatest curses of mankind." Gladstone 
also attacks the motive of prestige: though he allows that the reputation 
of an imperial state might usefully augment its "moral influence, power and 
grandeur," it ought only to follow incidentally from an otherwise admirable 
colonial program rather than from a vain desire to "make a show in the 
world."23 Having repudiated this array of imperial motives as unsound 
and unsavory, Gladstone asks, "Why then are colonies desirable?"24 He 
offers two answers. The first is material: colonization can open previously 
untapped resources and develop new markets, and so increase global trade. 
Yet because he does not believe that a colonial market should be fettered by 
any protected relationship with its metropole, it is ultimately valuable only as 
another market, not as a colonial market per se. Colonization is economic-
ally beneficial because it produces trade, not because it produces colonies. 
More interesting is Gladstone's other reason for expansion: "the moral 
and social results which a wise system of colonisation is calculated to 
produce. "25 The English state should be moved to establish colonies, he 
argues, only by the same beneficent urge that prompts English people 
to have children. The increase of population augments the power and 
stability of a nation, and is a universal moral blessing insofar as it multiplies 
the number of people living under conditions of decency and justice: 
We think that our country is a country blessed with laws and a constitution 
that are eminently beneficial to mankind, and if so, what can be more to be 
desired than that we should have the means of reproducing in different 
portions of the globe something as like as may be to that country which we 
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honour and revere? I think it is in a work by Mr. Roebuck that the 
expression is used, "that the object of colonisation is the creation of so 
many happy Englands." It is the reproduction of the image and likeness of 
England - the reproduction of a country in which liberty is reconciled with 
order, in which ancient institutions stand in harmony wirh popular free-
dom, and a full recognition of popular rights, and in which religion and law 
have found one of their most favoured homes. 26 
Gladstone's claim that the reproduction of Englishness throughout 
the world would morally profit humanity places him - just as much as his 
advocacy of free trade - squarely within a liberal tradition of imperialism. 
The seeds of this philosophical tradition, according to Uday Singh Mehta, 
can be found in Locke, and its fruition in the later work of Bentham, 
Macaulay, and the Mills. In its pursuit of universal truths and its understand-
ing of human progress as a general movement toward those truths, Mehta 
contends, British liberalism ironically sought to reproduce what was already 
familiar. Foreign peoples, like unfamiliar territories, were to be remodeled 
along English lines, transformed into so many happy Englishmen through 
a process justified by paternalistic metaphors of tutelage and kinship.2 7 
This civilizing mission, as it came to be known, would yield its full moral 
harvest when colonies could assume their own governance and deal with 
other states as free and rational agents in their own right. Gladstone empha-
sizes that self-governance is the only defensible terminus in the colonial 
journey, that the best relationships between states - even former colonies -
must be free and voluntary, and that sympathy, rather than formal political 
ties, was the only desirable basis for such relationships. The story of progress 
toward autonomy promised by the liberal narrative of the civilizing mission 
was later so hypocritically mouthed in colonial discourse that it is easy to 
forget the extent to which some liberals took it seriously; it was Gladstone's 
dogged support for Irish Home Rule, for instance, that fractured the Liberal 
pany and cemented the dominance of the New Imperialism. 28 
For Disraeli, by contrast, the imperial project implied no narrative 
of dissolution; the paramount duty conferred on the British by their 
Empire was to keep it. In his Crystal Palace speech of 1872 - venerated 
by the end of the century as the talismanic proclamation by which 
Conservatives had claimed the imperial mantle - Disraeli warned his 
audience against the Liberal threat: "If you look to the history of this 
country since the advent of Liberalism - fony years ago - you will find that 
there has been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much 
energy, and carried on with so much ability and acumen, as the attempts 
of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire of England. "29 
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In response to this menace, Disraeli announces that the Conservatives are 
dedicated to "the maintenance of the Empire." The possession of colonies 
is an end in itself, the "great object of the Tory party," rather than a font 
of wealth or an instrument of human progress. The colonies are not to 
be preserved for their own benefit - except perhaps incidentally - but as 
a "source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land." 30 But 
Disraeli's most insistent argument, the one to which he returns in his 
peroration, is his appeal to English pride. He frames the diverging paths of 
Liberal and Conservative principles as a choice between meekly accepting 
mediocrity within a pack of European states, on the one hand, or, on the 
other, asserting English greatness for all the world to see: 
The issue is not a mean one. It is whether you will be content to be a 
comfortable England, modelled and moulded upon Continental principles 
and meeting in due course an inevitable face, or whether you will be a great 
country, -an Imperial country- a country where your sons, when they rise, 
rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of their 
countrymen, but command the respect of the world.3' 
The motive force behind Disraeli's imperial vision, in other words, is the 
competitive pursuit of prestige that Gladstone had denounced. National 
greatness becomes contingent on the maintenance of the Empire, which 
allows not only for strength and happiness but also for the agonistic 
pleasures of a rise, individually and nationally, to "paramount positions," 
for the gratification of commanding "esteem" and "respect." 
Under this banner of imperial prestige, Disraeli offers all men of the 
recently enlarged electorate a chance to rally in a contest for lasting glory, 
both collectively in the ongoing rivalry of European powers and individu-
ally in a domestic political battle that is already underway. "Upon you 
depends the issue," he warns. "You must act as if everything depended on 
your individual effons."32 These two levels of struggle are fused together by 
an explicit appeal to competitive manliness. The "sons" of his auditors will 
be the beneficiaries of an empire maintained, while, more immediately, the 
threat of Liberal and continental principles represents a test of their manly 
resolve: "Yes, I tell all who are here present that there is a responsibility 
which you have incurred to-day, and which you must meet like men." Part 
of this responsibility, he goes on, is to recruit others to answer the masculine 
challenge: "Make each man feel how much rests on his own exertions."33 
The ongoing masculinization of the imperial mission, already hinted at 
in Disraeli's famous exhortation, will be explored through the remainder 
of this book. Before moving forward, however, I want to emphasize two 
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related developments that will reappear in later chapters. The first is the 
marginalization of morality - often, but not exclusively, Christian 
morality - in New Imperialist discourse. The personal contrast between 
the dour Gladstone and the flamboyant Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield after 
1876) promoted the view that the latter's vision had more to do with 
seeming great than doing right. So too did the perceptions of Disraeli's 
second administration, especially during the crisis surrounding the Eastern 
Question (1876-78). His apparent nonchalance toward the slaughter of 
Bulgarian Christians by the Turks, and his subsequent policy of support-
ing the Ottoman Empire as a buffer against Russian expansion, looked like 
proof that morality did not enter into Disraeli's calculations of British 
interests. So, at any rate, argued Gladstone repeatedly during the righteous 
barnstorming of his Midlothian campaign. Gladstone's towering moral 
dudgeon - coming as it did from a figure conspicuous for his pious 
rectitude - contributed to the sense that this new "imperialism" (or 
"Beaconsfieldism," as he called it) was defined by its contrast to a Liberal 
foreign policy grounded in moral principle. Gladstone's attack may have 
helped him back to power in the short run, but over time his principles 
were associated with what imperialists regarded as proof of his weakness, 
especially after the ignominious end of the First Boer War in 1881 and the 
martyrdom of Gordon at Khartoum in 1885. His belief that colonies should 
be preserved only for the right reasons could be interpreted as readiness to 
abandon the Empire altogether, just as Disraeli had warned. As The Times 
put it, "'Imperialism' was a word invented to stamp Lord Beaconsfield's 
supposed designs with popular reprobation. But the weapon wounded the 
hand that wielded it, and a suspicion was engendered, which seriously 
injured the Liberal cause, that Liberalism was in some sort an antithesis 
of Imperialism."34 But if Gladstone's crusade had linked Liberalism with 
anti-imperialism in public opinion, other prominent Liberals, such as 
Edward Dicey and James Fitzjames Stephen, had already joined the 
New Imperialist consensus that England's greatness depended on the 
maintenance of the Empire, and that this political fact required no moral 
defense. Dicey, defending expediency over principle, frankly admitted "the 
difficulty of reconciling the existence of our Empire, or of any Empire 
supported by force, with the doctrines of the Sermon on the Mount. "35 
The second pertinent development is the declining appeal of the civiliz-
ing mission, which had been the narrative corollary to the Empire's 
moral duty. The belief that colonization was a story of progress had 
been crucial to liberal imperialism, both as an expression of its ultimate 
humanitarian purpose and as a justification for the inapplicability of 
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universal principles to those peoples who were not yet prepared to enter 
into the sisterhood of nations. Yet faith in the possibility of civilizing 
subject races was broadly eroding by the later decades of the nineteenth 
century, and not only in Britain. As Andrew Porter summarizes, "There is 
no doubt at all that from mid-century the general outlook of Europeans 
rapidly became more critically dismissive of other societies, doubtful of 
non-European capacity for change and progress, and far more readily 
insistent on their own objectives and inclinations." 36 Porter suggests 
that the shift was abetted primarily by the rise of scientific racism, which 
implied that non-Europeans were naturally unable to adapt to European 
cultural models: "Once superiority of culture was linked to that of race, a 
different morality began to influence the practice of European expansion. 
Assimilation of European and non-European came to seem less desirable 
and perhaps impossible."37 In the case of Britain, the waning appeal of 
the civilizing mission was punctuated by a series of crises - the Sepoy 
Rebellion of 1857, the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865, the Ilbert Bill 
controversy of 1883 - that convinced many Britons that the elevation of 
their subject races, at least within any foreseeable future, was sentimental 
nonsense and unsound policy. By the end of the century, invocations of 
the old rhetoric of the civilizing mission tended to describe the extension 
or consolidation of British authority rather than the transformation 
of natives; it meant the effort to supply order, health, and infrastructural 
improvements to peoples who could not, and could probably never be 
trusted to, provide for themselves. In this way the relatively static ideal 
of maintenance displaced the liberal telos of progress, leaving the story of 
the Empire as a picaresque tale in which adventures multiplied without 
ever concluding. As the colonial secretary, Lord Crewe, explained to the 
House of Lords in 1909, "What will be the future of India fifty, sixty, or 
a hundred years hence need not, I think, trouble us. "38 It was not only 
as though (as John Seeley had famously joked) the Empire had been 
acquired in a fit of absence of mind, but also that it was to be retained 
in an absence of purpose. 
Still, we should not assume, as did many anti-imperialists, that the drift 
away from the rhetoric of high moral purpose or the grand narrative of the 
civilizing mission led to an intoxicated anarchy of principles. Instead, 
the culture of the New Imperialism produced its own range of images, 
idioms, and ethical frameworks that could make sense of Britain's global 
relationships and articulate new narratives of its history and destiny. This, 
as I shall argue, is why emerging constructions of masculinity played so 
vital a role. An emphasis on the competitive dimensions of manliness - as 
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derived, for instance, from discourses of honor, gamesmanship, or military 
codes - provided conceptual templates through which the aggressive 
ideologies of the New Imperialism could be understood and valued. 
Moreover, insofar as competitive impulses could be represented as inherently 
male, masculinity could naturalize international rivalries and conflicts, and 
also challenge the manhood of dissenters. This emphasis on a naturally 
competitive manliness, rather than on the developmental ideals of midcen-
tury manhood, also underwrote a sense of history in which struggle was 
constant and never-ending. 
Pressed into the service of a New Imperialist vision of global order, 
representations of the nature of manhood betray signs of new anxieties 
that became characteristic of this period: the worry, for instance, about 
the debilitating influence of civilization on manly character, and the 
heightened sense of vulnerability to shame - both national and individual -
in the eyes of male competitors . Yet they also reveal ironies that consider-
ably complicate the ramifications of New Imperialist identities. For 
example, even though Disraeli had painted Gladstone's platform as 
cosmopolitan and his own as national, in many ways Gladstone's liberal 
imperialism had depended more on notions of Englishness than its 
successor. Gladstone had contended that English greatness was rooted in 
England itself, which is why the independence of the colonies posed no 
threat. But for the New Imperialists, the Empire was integral to English 
identity and to its status relative to other nations; the Empire, and the men 
who made it, were therefore necessarily defined in comparative and adver-
sarial terms, and the standards of comparison had to be transnational 
rather than insular. Hence the masculinity that undergirded the Empire 
was less self-sufficiently English or even civilized, and more intent on 
looking abroad for standards of a global manliness. Thus we arrive at a 
second remarkable irony: just as imperial discourse was increasingly 
authorized by hardening taxonomies of racial difference, it could look to 
other races for symbols of masculine vinue. The very simplicity of stereo-
types that reduced whole races to a few essential qualities made men of 
those races imaginatively available as emblems of character, in some cases as 
the epitomes of manly traits wonh admiring or emulating. Though some 
races were routinely regarded as effeminate or weak, others were represented 
as naturally warlike (e.g., Zulus, Sikhs, and Pathans), fearless (Sudanese 
Dervishes), loyal (Gurkhas), or honorable (Arabs and Japanese).39 
Amid the uncenainties left by the decline of developmental models 
of masculine vinue, such racial stereotypes stood in as benchmarks of 
manliness by which British men might measure themselves. And to the 
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extent that racial qualities were understood as essential and unchanging, 
foreign men could signify masculine standards undiminished by the 
decadence of modern civilization. They represented a purer masculinity 
of the past, one linked to the nation's glorious history or to the uncor-
rupted impulses of boyhood. This association of boys, foreigners, and the 
men of Britain's past was noted with alarm by Gladstone, who objected 
to the rising emphasis on honor in imperialist discourse as a disturbing 
anachronism: 
Men talk as if we were free to fight, as a Scotch lord would fight in 
Edinburgh three centuries ago for the centre of the causeway; or as a boy 
fought at Eton in my time to determine whether he could or could not 'lick' 
another boy; or as in Ireland, at a fair, shillelahs were flourished, and heads 
cruelly mauled and broken, for the simple preference of one name to 
another, or for the pleasure of that excitement which fighting brings. If 
we are to revive, in the present daylight, the levities of childhood, the 
manners of a semi-barbarous age, or the excesses pardonable in an over-
driven people, it is high time to take heed and to make some inquiry 
concerning the paths of honour and of shame.40 
For champions of progress like Gladstone, the celebration of competitive 
and potentially violent styles of honor was a horrifying atavism, a derange-
ment of the narratives on which masculine maturity and English civilization 
were predicated. Yet New Imperialists traced precisely these connections 
between boyhood, history, and the colonies to construct normative 
models of manliness, concurring with Gladstone's premise but reversing 
his conclusion. Hence a final irony in the debates over imperial ideals that 
simmered through the popular press from the 1870s on: while critics of 
the New Imperialism charged their opponents with embracing a resurgence 
of barbarous attitudes, accusing them of thinking like savages on the 
frontier, the advocates of the emerging imperial masculinity - especially in 
the fantasies of popular literature - were strikingly inclined to agree. 
The ironies I have sketched here are examined more closely in the first 
two chapters, which together introduce the broad themes of New Imperi-
alist notions of manliness and their complicated relationship to stereotypes 
of non-European masculinities. Chapter I concerns the reconstitution 
of better manhood, showing that the thrust of normative masculinity 
was reoriented from the midcentury priority of personal development to 
its late-century preoccupation with international competition. The key 
texts here are Kipling's patriotic poems - the genre to which he turned 
when he wanted to influence popular opinion most directly - which 
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demonstrate how conceptions of honor (including Kipling's own twist 
on masculine abjection) reframed male experience in the service of a global 
struggle for prestige. The second chapter complements this analysis by 
turning to the increasingly common examples of English men whose heroic 
glamour was expressed through cultural cross-dressing; that is, through their 
assumption of foreign clothing as a means of appropriating signs of exotic 
manliness. Investigating stories by A. E. W. Mason, G. A. Henty, and 
Kipling, I argue that the frequency of the trope in this period indicates the 
acute awareness of the performative dimensions of masculinity demanded 
by the pursuit of prestige, and that it expressed fantasies of an unusual form 
of hybridity that bolstered new strategies of colonial authority. 
Chapters 3 and 4 consider representations of boyhood that overturned 
mid-Victorian conceptions of masculine development. Chapter J explores 
one of the favorite figures of the New Imperialist imagination - the boy 
who never grows up - in light of the turn from liberal, progressive 
narratives toward the principle of imperial maintenance. Focusing particu-
larly on fiction that pairs boys with pirates, I argue that together these 
figures naturalize an ethos of competitive play, which operated outside 
structures of conventional morality and international law but which 
offered in their place new sets of rules by which imperialism could be 
appreciated as a satisfying game of global adventure. Continuing to analyze 
changing ideas of maturation, Chapter 4 discusses the quasi-scientific 
discovery of a natural affinity between boys and savages. I chart the 
emergence of new attitudes about this connection in stories about public 
schools, the most celebrated incubators of manly character. Reading 
Thomas Hughes's Tom Brown's School Days and Kipling's Stalky & Co. 
as allegories of distinct models of colonial authority, I show how the 
New Imperialism recognized the usefulness of the savage boy, and how 
the Empire, once the would-be schoolmaster to the world, now conceded 
that it had much to learn from other men. 
In the final three chapters, I turn from disrupted narratives of individual 
development to the grander scale of historical change, showing that the 
full of the liberal telos of global progress encouraged the wild anachronisms 
of late Victorian and Edwardian popular fiction. Chapter 5 describes 
the astonishing proliferation of stories of exotic lost worlds, focusing 
particularly on contributions by Kipling, Rider Haggard, and Conan 
Doyle, to show how Britons began to understand barbarism as an aspect 
of manly character worth rediscovering. Chapter 6 investigates popular 
mummy stories in relation to Britain's occupation of Egypt, arguing that 
the themes and narrative structure of these stories reproduce the politics 
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of the "veiled Protectorate" and, more generally, Disraeli's ideal of mainten-
ance. The mummy tale rewrites the political "Egyptian Question" as a love 
stoty through which the Empire might wed itself to the timeless endurance 
of Pharaonic splendor. The final chapter turns to the futures imagined in the 
scientific romances of H. G. Wells, whose politics were decidedly opposed 
to most of the writers considered here. Nevertheless, Wells's attempts to 
imagine evolutionary progress toward a more rational future repeatedly 
collapse into scenes of savage, two-fisted masculine violence. Meanwhile, 
the epitomes of rationalism, including those liberals who advocated restraint 
of bodily pleasure, are transformed in his fiction into sexless, macrocephalic 
monsters. I argue that the failure even of a progressive like Wells to imagine 
a future for masculinity demonstrates the hegemonic force of contemporary 
assumptions about imperial manhood. Together, these three chapters 
exhibit the fantastic timescapes of New Imperialist masculinity: its alluring 
past, its static present, and its impossible future. 
All of these chapters focus on popular literature, poems and stories that 
were themselves widely read by contemporaries (as were the works of 
Kipling, Stevenson, and Haggard) or that belonged to genres (such as 
school stories, pirate tales, or lost-world adventures) that were enthusiastic-
ally received. Yet in this study, popularity itself is not an object of analysis 
in the ways that imperialism and masculinity are. Rather, popular literature 
constitutes the domain from which I have chosen my examples, the group 
of texts that collectively offer us the best chance to discern broad patterns 
of cultural assumptions about imperial masculinity. Whatever the aesthetic 
merits of these works, their reception offers us some measure - inescapably 
limited though it may be - of the common aspirations and desires of the 
many readers who responded to them so eagerly. These works shaped, and 
were shaped by, the fantasies of an age, and they express those dreams 
more freely and more intimately than do the discourses of politics or 
science, and far more than the dispassionate record of actual events. 
Though influenced by such discourses and events, popular literature is 
also the product of the imagination - as are, in their different ways, 
masculinity and the Empire itself - and so it is with popular literature 
that we can begin to understand what it meant to be a better man in the 
age of the New Imperialism. 
